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PARTIES IN THE COURT BELOW
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APPELLANTS REPLY ARGUMENT
As outlined below, the positions taken in Defendant ORR Enterprise's Appellee
Brief are untenable, unsupported in law or by the record. Based on the briefs, the need
for reversal and remand shows itself unequivocally.
Defendant attempts to expand the appellate review requested by
Plaintiff/Appellant Home Abstract beyond the narrow legal issue raised in the appellant's
opening brief. Plaintiff Home Abstract is asking the Court to decide, as a matter of law,
whether Plaintiff Home Abstract acquired the original plaintiffs standing to sue, by virtue
of a Rule 25 substitution.
Defendant, in its Appellee Brief, attempts to focus the Court's attention on a
different issue; the issue of whether the original plaintiff himself had standing to pursue
his quiet title claims. This separate issue was never seriously addressed by any of the
pleadings or proceedings on file in the matter below, and is wholly unsupported by the
record. It is important to note that Defendant never seriously challenged the original
plaintiffs standing to pursue his quiet title claims during the two-and-a-half years that the
original plaintiff prosecuted this lawsuit on his own, and never contested the substitution
of Plaintiff Home Abstract in October of 2006. Furthermore, Defendant never raised the
issue of the original plaintiffs standing, or lack thereof, in its Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment or during its oral argument on said Motion before the District Court. In fact,
for purposes of Plaintiff Home Abstract's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Defendants1 Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, it was assumed that the original
plaintiff did, in fact, have standing to sue. The fact that Defendant did not include a
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single record citation in support of its claim that its motion below was based on the
original plaintiffs lack of standing, is indicative of the utter lack of record support for
Defendant's new contention.
Since the issue of whether the original plaintiff had standing to sue was never
addressed below, Plaintiff has not had the opportunity to present evidence or arguments
on this point, and the District Court has not been able to directly evaluate and address this
question. Furthermore, since the record is devoid of any discussion of the issue, this
Court should refrain from deciding this question and should assume, for purposes of
appeal, that the original plaintiff had standing to sue. The Court should focus its review
on the issue of whether a substitute plaintiff substituted pursuant to Rule 25(c) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, acquires the original plaintiffs standing to sue. If the
Court answers this question in the affirmative, this case can be remanded to the District
Court so that the issue of the original plaintiffs standing, or lack thereof, can be
appropriately addressed.
Defendant's Appellee Brief also fails to adequately address the following central
and fully supported points of Home Abstract's well-taken appeal:
•

Courts have held that when there is no objection from the non-substituting
party to the granting of a motion for substitution, the non-substituting party
is barred from later objecting to the substitution. Aplt. Br. at 9-10.

•

Once a substitution has occurred, the substitute party steps into the
procedural position of the original party. Aplt. Br. at 10-11.

•

Once a substitution has occurred, procedural characteristics such as
standing are transferred, by virtue of the Rule 25(c) substitution, from the
original plaintiff to the substitute plaintiff despite deficiencies that would
ordinarily prevent the substitute plaintiff from carrying on the original
plaintiffs claims. Aplt. Br. at 11-12.

As a result, the Court should overturn the District Court's decision holding that
Plaintiff lacked standing to pursue a quiet title action against the subject property and, if
necessary, remand this matter to the District Court for additional proceedings.
L

DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE ORIGINAL PLAINTIFF LACKED
STANDING TO SUE WAS NEVER SERIOUSLY ADDRESSED BELOW.
THEREFORE, FOR PURPOSES OF THIS APPEAL, IT SHOULD BE
ASSUMED THAT THE ORIGINAL PLAINTIFF DID HAVE STANDING
TO SUE.
It is axiomatic that issues not raised before the trial court are waived and cannot

properly be considered by an appellate court. State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 114, ^| 13, 61
P.3d 1062, 1066; see also Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549, 550 n.2 (Utah
1984) (reversed on other grounds) (noting that when the record on appeal contains no
indication that a certain issue was reached or addressed by the trial court, the appellate
court cannot consider that issue).
In this matter, Defendant's primary argument in opposition to Plaintiff Home
Abstract's appeal is that the original plaintiff, Corey Vandenberg, lacked standing to sue.
Aplee. Br. at 12-20. This argument, however, was never seriously addressed below by
the parties or the District Court. In fact, for two-and-a-half years prior to the substitution
of Home Abstract for Vandenberg in October of 2006, Vandenberg pursued his quiet title
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claims and never had his standing to sue seriously challenged. For example, in or about
April of 2006, Defendant filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The premise of
this Motion was that Vandenberg and Defendant both had property interests in the subject
property, but that Defendant's interest was superior to Vandenberg's interest because
Defendant was a bona fide purchaser of the subject property. [R. 74-84]. The District
Court denied Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on this issue because it
determined that there were material factual disputes that precluded summary judgment.
[R. 269-70].
On October 24, 2006, Plaintiff Home Abstract was substituted into the position of
the original plaintiff by an Order of Substitution made pursuant to Rule 25(c) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. [R. 312-13]. Defendant did not oppose this substitution; and in
fact, signed a stipulation consenting to the substitution. [R. 293-94].
Furthermore, Defendant never raised the issue of the original plaintiffs standing in
its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment or during its oral argument on said Motion
before the District Court. In fact, for purposes of Plaintiff Home Abstract's Motion for
Summary Judgment and Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, it was
assumed that the original plaintiff did, in fact, have standing to sue. This assumption is
evidenced by the fact that all of the discussion during oral argument focused on "Home

Defendants did assert, as an affirmative defense, that Vandenberg lacked standing to
pursue his claims. [R. 23-8; 316-28]. There does not appear, however, to have been any
attempt made by Defendants to actively assert this affirmative defense before the District
Court.

Abstract" and not "Corey Vandenberg," and appears to have been expressly
acknowledged by Defendant's counsel during oral argument. [R. 608]; [Tr. 24-5; 32].
As outlined above, the issue of whether the original plaintiff had standing to sue
was never seriously raised before the District Court; and therefore, the parties have never
had the opportunity to present evidence or arguments on this issue, and the District Court
was not able to evaluate or address this question. As a result, it would be inappropriate
for this Court to determine, on appeal, whether the original plaintiff had standing to
initiate the quiet title action that is the subject of this action.
Rather than focus on this extra-record issue, the Court should focus its
determination on whether, as a matter of law, a substitute plaintiff, substituted pursuant to
Rule 25(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, acquires the original plaintiffs standing
to sue. To make this determination, the Court need not resolve the question of whether
the original plaintiff in this matter had standing to sue and can assume, as the District
Court appeared to, that the original plaintiff did have standing to sue. The Court can then
remand this case to the District Court so that the issue of the original plaintiffs standing,
or lack thereof, can be appropriately addressed.
For the record, Plaintiff Home Abstract does contend that the original plaintiff had
standing to sue. The original plaintiff claimed title to the subject property by virtue of
two deeds (i) a November 29, 2003 Quit Claim Deed from Raymond and Valerie
Vanderdoes to Wheelock Holdings, L.L.C, a Utah limited liability company solely owned
and managed by the original plaintiff; and (ii) a March 25, 2004 Warranty Deed from
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Raymond and Valerie Vanderdoes. [R. 1-8. 497-503, 431-320].2 The original plaintiff
also argued, and Plaintiff Home Abstract similarly contends, that the original plaintiffs
ownership interest in the subject property is prior and superior to Defendant's claimed
interest. These are factual issues that will need to be addressed by the District Court on
remand.
IL

DEFENDANTS FAILURE TO OBJECT TO PLAINTIFF HOME
ABSTRACTS SUBSTITUTION INTO THE POSITION OF THE
ORIGINAL PLAINTIFF AT THE TIME OF SUBSTITUTION BARS
IT FROM NOW OBJECTING TO THE SUBSTITUTION.
At least one court that has addressed Rule 25 substitutions held that when there is

no objection from the non-substituting party to the granting of a motion for substitution,
the non-substituting party is barred from later objecting to the substitution. See Investors
Mortgage Co. v. Rhodia, 31 Conn. App. 476. 481 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993). This holding is
significant in this matter because it appears that Defendant, by belatedly raising the issue
of the original plaintiffs standing, is in effect attempting to object to Plaintiff Home
Abstract's substitution.
Plaintiff Home Abstract was substituted into the position of the original plaintiff
by an Order of the District Court on or about November 6, 2006. fR. 312-13]. Defendant
did not oppose this substitution; and in fact, signed a stipulation consenting to the
2

For the record, Plaintiff Home Abstract also objects to the comments made by Judge
Jones during oral argument in which he stated: 'There's no question that a trust was
created. There's no question the property was put in the trust. There's no question the
trust merged at some point." [Tr. 34]. These comments appear to contradict his earlier
statements that "there is a real dispute of facts" as to the issue of trust formation. [Tr.
33]. The factual issues surrounding the Vanderdoes Trust, like those related to the
original plaintiffs standing to sue, involve issues of fact that the District Court needs to
properly address on remand.

substitution. [R. 293-94]. If Defendant objects to the original plaintiffs standing to sue,
or to Plaintiff Home Abstract's standing as substitute plaintiff, it should have objected to
the substitution at the time that the substitution was contemplated and effectuated.
Defendant failed to do so, and should now be barred from objecting to Plaintiff Home
Abstract's substitution or the legal effect that flows from that substitution.
HI.

ONCE A RULE 25 SUBSTITUTION HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED,
PROCEDURAL CHARACTERISTICS, SUCH AS STANDING, ARE
TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORIGINAL PLAINTIFF TO THE
SUBSTITUTE PLAINTIFF, DESPITE DEFICIENCIES THAT WOULD
ORDINARILY PREVENT THE SUBSTITUTE PLAINTIFF FROM
ASSERTING THE ORIGINAL PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS.
It is clear that the purpose of substitutions, made pursuant to Rule 25 of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure (and the identical provisions of Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure), is to transfer the procedural characteristics of the original plaintiff to
the substitute plaintiff in order to allow the substitute plaintiff to carry on the original
plaintiffs claims, without disrupting normal business transactions during the pendency of
litigation or unnecessarily extending litigation. The United States Supreme Court made
reference to this purpose in Freeport-McMoran, Inc. v . K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426
(1991), when it justified the extension of diversity jurisdiction to a clearly non-diverse
substitute party. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 498 U.S. at 428.
This underlying purpose is on display in a variety of substitution cases where the
courts allowed the substitute plaintiff to acquire the original party's procedural
characteristics (or "step into the shoes" of the original party) and carry on the original
party's claims, despite procedural deficiencies that would ordinarily bar the substitute
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plaintiff from participating in the litigation. For example, the United States Supreme
Court allowed a non-diverse substitute party to carry on with a federal lawsuit premised
upon diversity jurisdiction because the substitute plaintiff had acquired, by virtue of
substitution, the plaintiffs diversity. See Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 498 U.S. at 428. The
First Circuit Court of Appeals extended personal jurisdiction to a substitute defendant
who clearly lacked contacts with the forum state because the substitute defendant had
stepped into the shoes of the original defendant, and the original defendant's contacts
were imputed to the substitute plaintiff. See Explosives Corp. of Am. v. Garlam Enters.
Corp., 817 F.2d 894, 906 (1st Cir. 1987). Similarly, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the substitution of one party for another would not disrupt the venue of an
ongoing federal lawsuit, because the court would essentially ignore the substitution and
allow the matter to proceed as if the substitution had never occurred. See Minnesota
Mining Co. v. ECO Chem., Inc., 757 F.2d 1256. 1262 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Defendant apparently objects to the underlying purpose of substitutions by arguing
that the substitute plaintiff must be independently qualified to carry on the original party's
claims. Apllee. Br. at 21. For example, Defendant argues that the substitution of one
party into the position of another should not overcome the general rule requiring transfers
of property to be in writing. Apllee Br. at 21. Surely the non-substituted parties in the
cases referenced above similarly argued that substitution should not be allowed to
overcome the federal statutes governing diversity jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, or
venue. Despite those arguments; however, the courts above decided that substitution
could overcome contrary statutory provisions and held that substituted parties could step

into the shoes of the original party, despite deficiencies that would normally prevent them
from asserting the original plaintiffs claims.
The situation is substantially similar to the cases cited above. Plaintiff Home
Abstract, by virtue of the Rule 25 substitution, stepped into the original plaintiffs
position, and should be allowed to carry on the original plaintiffs claims, despite the
alleged deficiencies

that would normally prevent Plaintiff Home Abstract from

asserting the original plaintiffs quiet title claims. The substitution, in effect, should
allow Plaintiff Home Abstract to carry on the lawsuit filed by the original plaintiff, as if
no change in the parties had occurred.
Defendant argues that the Utah Courts should reject the underlying purpose of
substitutions in quiet title cases because this rule would do nothing to protect quiet title
defendants from the claims of third-parties who claim an interest in the subject property
by virtue of a transfer from the original plaintiff. Aplee Br. at 24. This complication;
however, is not realistic, and has already been addressed by the substitution process laid
out in Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Before a party can be substituted
pursuant to Rule 25, the original party must move the Court for a substitution and/or
receive the consent of the non-substituting party. Thus, the Court and the non-

For the record, Plaintiff Home Abstract does claim an interest in the subject property
separate from the original plaintiff, Corey Vandenberg, by virtue of a June 2007 Quit
Claim Deed from Vandenberg Investments & Properties, L.L.C., a limited liability
company formally known as Wheelock Holdings, L.L.C. Wheelock Holdings, L.L.C
received deed to the subject property from the Vanderdoeses on November 29, 2003.
Wheelock's interest was subsequently assigned to Vandenberg Investments & Properties,
L.L.C. This June 2007 Quit Claim Deed was attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavits ([R. 556-563]) and was discussed
during oral argument ([Tr. 12-13; 23-4; 28-9]).
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substituting party can. at the time of substitution, evaluate whether the substituting party
is sufficiently qualified to step into the shoes of the original party. This process protects
a quiet title defendant from becoming subject to the claims of unidentified third parties
who claim an interest in the defendant's property. Once that substitution is accomplished;
however, the substituted party should be allowed to carry the original party's claims
forward.
In this case, the substitution was properly carried out pursuant to Rule 25 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The original party, Corey Vandenberg, apparently
consulted with Defendant about the contemplated substitution, and Defendant signed a
stipulation consenting to that substitution. [R. 293-94]. The signed stipulation was then
presented to the District Court and an Order of Substitution was signed and entered by
the District Court. [R. 312-13].
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons. Appellant respectfully requests that this Court overturn
the District Court's decision holding that Plaintiff lacked standing to pursue a quiet title
action against the subject property and, if necessary, remand this matter to the District
Court for additional proceedings.
DATED this L ^

day of April, 2008.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY

Timothy w . Blackburn
Richard H. Reeve
Attorney for Appellant
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